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23/10/14

"The best speech an Israeli diplomat ever held" George Deek in Oslo

13/9/14

The 2014 Israel-Hamas War: A Preliminary Net Assessment

Shai Feldman
September 8, 2014
http://nationalinterest.org/

 "Neither Israel nor Hamas have gained anything significant from the violence."

On August 26, after more than fifty days of fighting, the latest phase of the Israel-Hamas War ended with an Egyptian-mediated ceasefire. It will be months, if not years, before the ramifications of the 2014 war will become clear and fully apparent. At this early point, just over a week after the ceasefire was announced, any assessment of the violence must be considered tentative at best. The following are a number of early reflections on this recent explosion of Palestinian-Israeli violence:
First, as reflected in the ceasefire agreement, neither Israel, nor Hamas has gained anything significant from the violence. Hamas may have gained a modest expansion of fishing rights for Gazans and may gain some improvement in the ease of movement and access of people and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. Israel may eventually gain some tightening of the constraints on the smuggling of weapons and ammunition into the Strip. None of these constitute strategic gains.
Hamas did not gain any significant change in Gaza’s isolation—neither its demands for building a seaport, nor for the rebuilding of the airport were accepted. Similarly, there is little hope that Israel’s wish to see the Gaza Strip demilitarized will ever materialize. Talk of a grand bargain in the framework of which Hamas will agree to disarm in exchange for massive reconstruction of the Gaza Strip will most likely remain just that—talk.
A second prism leading to the conclusion that neither side has gained anything significant in the war is that the fighting ended not because one or both sides had achieved their objectives, but rather because at some point, Israeli and Hamas leaders concluded that there was no point to the war’s continuation. Namely, that more fighting with its associated costs were not likely to yield a different result. Given its limited resources and unlimited aims, Hamas could not coerce Israel into making significant concessions merely by increasing Israel’s pain and suffering incrementally through the further use of rocket fire. Its attempts to increase Israeli costs dramatically through a “game changer”—the imaginative use of “attack tunnels”—was defeated by a combination of Israeli technology and the agility of the IDF’s response teams.
Similarly, Israel was unlikely to coerce Hamas into submission by conquering additional neighborhoods in the outskirts of Gaza City. Yet it was reluctant to attempt to do this through a “game changer” of its own: a deep penetration of the heart of Gaza by ground forces in an attempt to destroy the command and control structure of Hamas’ military arm. This reluctance was fueled by four concerns: First, the expectation that such a strike would be associated with very high casualties on both sides; Second, unwillingness for Israel to find itself once again holding a population of 1.6 million Gaza Palestinians against its will; Third, huge uncertainty about an “exit strategy”—what would allow Israel to end its reoccupation and leave? And finally (and perhaps most importantly), fear that with Hamas destroyed, the IDF’s eventual withdrawal would leave Gaza completely chaotic and Jihadi groups far worse than Hamas would enjoy an ideal breeding ground.
The third insight is that no factor seems to have played a greater role in determining the parameters of the war than the dramatic changes witnessed in the broader Middle East in the aftermath of the so-called Arab Spring. Most importantly, Hamas found itself completely alone in the fight. No Arab or non-Arab state and no significant nonstate actor came to its assistance and no significant expressions of mass sympathy with Hamas could be observed. Indeed, it is remarkable that the few pro-Hamas demonstrations in Europe during the war were far larger than anything seen in the Middle East during the fighting.
Hamas’ isolation resulted from three factors: First, its decision in late 2011 to side with the rebels in Syria and to relocate its headquarters away from Damascus. At the very least, the decision alienated Syria’s Assad regime, Iran and Hezbollah who saw Hamas’ behavior as nothing short of betrayal. Second, the July 2013 counter-revolution in Egypt resulted in a new regime which regards the Muslim Brotherhood as an existential threat. As Cairo’s new leaders view Hamas as an arm of the Brotherhood, by implication it has also come to be regarded as a threat to Egypt’s national security. Third, the disintegration of some Arab states—notably Syria, Iraq and Libya—and the inward focus of all other Arab states produced an environment in which the fate of Hamas was not a priority for any important player in the Middle East.     
Another important determinant of the war’s course and consequences was the dysfunctional domestic politics of both Hamas and Israel. In Hamas’ case, the geographic split between the leadership in Gaza and Khaled Mashaal’s residence in Qatar proved a serious obstacle to ceasing the fire. Backed by Qatari money, Mashaal took a hard line in the talks to end the fighting, in the hope of extracting what Israel would never yield. In the end, the decision to accept a ceasefire was taken by Hamas’ Gaza leadership, sidelining, if not altogether ignoring, the objections that Mashaal raised.
Similarly on the Israeli side, Israel’s prime minister seemed to be challenged by members of his own cabinet as much as by Hamas. Immediately after the abduction and killing of the three Israeli teenagers in June, right-wing politicians began to argue that Netanyahu’s response was weak, hesitant and indecisive. Later and throughout the fighting, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Economics Minister Naftali Bennett openly disputed the limited operational objectives defined for the IDF—suppressing Hamas’ rocket and mortar fire, locating and destroying the attack tunnels, and restoring Israeli deterrence. Instead they argued for ordering the IDF to defeat and destroy Hamas. Not surprisingly, both took strong objection to Netanyahu’s decision to accept the ceasefire proposal. “Without destroying Hamas,” argued Lieberman, “another round of fighting is only a matter of time.” Needless to say, the specter of a foreign minister keeping his office despite having criticized his prime minister’s policy in no uncertain terms is without precedent even in the Western world.
These attacks seemed to have been successful, with negative consequences for Netanyahu as well as for Israel at large. In the short term, the attacks sank Netanyahu’s approval rating to its lowest point. This was partly because many Israelis were persuaded that in dealing with Hamas their prime minister was indeed weak, hesitant and indecisive. But equally, as he tolerated his right-wing opponents’ attacks, Netanyahu seemed increasingly to have lost control over his own government, thus giving ammunition to critics on the left who argued that he was weak, hesitant and indecisive. But even more important, in the immediate aftermath of the war, the attacks forced Netanyahu to attempt to restore his credibility and credentials as the leader of Israel’s right wing. He did this by allowing the decision to confiscate a thousand acres of land in the West Bank, presumably for additional settlement construction.
This decision is bound to have two interrelated strategic consequences: first, increasing Palestinian despair regarding the prospects of resolving the conflict with Israel. Now more of them are convinced that Netanyahu was never serious about his stated commitment to a two-state solution. Second, further weakening PA President Mahmoud Abbas by making him appear as collaborating with Israel’s continued occupation. Thus, any Israeli hopes of strengthening Abbas as a long-term strategy of building him as an alternative to Hamas were discarded under the short-term pressures to restore Netanyahu’s right-wing credentials.
The negative international reaction to the postwar land confiscation further exacerbated the most consequential of Israel’s losses during the almost eight weeks of fighting: Hamas seems to have won the so-called “war of the narratives.” In the latter arena, Israeli assertions that the large number of civilian casualties in Gaza resulted from Hamas’ strategy of using human shields to protect its weapons and command structure—hiding their rocket launchers and commanders in homes, schools, mosques and hospitals—could not overcome the negative emotional resonance of the observable mass devastation of Gaza’s neighborhoods as reflected in international media photos and footage.
Finally and possibly most tragic of all, at the end of the fighting, Israel and Hamas both remain locked into their prewar strategic impasse. As long as Hamas continues to adhere to its ideological rejection of Israel’s right to exist and thus to its unlimited aims, Israel will not make any concessions that dramatically improve Hamas’ capacity to meet the minimal aspirations of Gaza’s population. And as long as Israeli policies—especially its continued settlement construction—continue to undermine any prospects for implementing a two-state solution to the conflict, Palestinians will continue to resist “occupation,” thus making another violent clash unavoidable if not inevitable.
Shai Feldman is the Judith and Sidney Swartz Director of Brandeis University’s Crown Center for Middle East Studies and a Senior Fellow atHarvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Image: Flickr/Israel Defense Forces/CC by-nc 2.0
 
 

8/9/14

Three things you (probably) don't know about islam



Thank you Constantinos..

5/9/14

4th Sep 2014... ''Too much'' democracy???




This man is a world danger...
Hopefully western world has started to wake up...

30/8/14

Britain facing 'greatest terrorist threat' in history

9:41PM BST 29 Aug 2014
The Telegraph






Britain faces the “greatest and deepest” terror threat in the country’s history, David Cameron warned as he pledged emergency measures to tackle extremists.
The UK threat level was raised to “severe” — its second highest — meaning that a terrorist attack is “highly likely” in light of the growing danger from British jihadists returning from Iraq and Syria.
The Prime Minister said that the risk posed by Isil (the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) will last for “decades” and raised the prospect of an expanding terrorist nation “on the shores of the Mediterranean”.
He disclosed that Isil had made “specific” threats against the UK and did not rule out military action to tackle the growing problem.
More than 500 Britons are believed to have gone to Iraq and Syria and at least half have returned, with some feared to be planning attacks here. One major plot has been foiled.
The warning came as it emerged that a laptop seized from Isil in Syria contained research on how to make a biological bomb and religious justification to use it against civilians.
On Monday, Mr Cameron will unveil a number of “uncompromising” measures to help tackle British jihadists and fill the “gaps in our armoury”.
They will include stopping British fanatics from travelling to or returning from the war zones by making it easier to seize their passports.
He is also expected to tighten controls that can be put on the movement and activities of terror suspects within the UK.
It is the first time in three years that the threat level has stood at severe, just one short of “critical”, which would mean an attack is imminent.
The raised alert will lead to an increase in the number of armed police on the streets, especially around landmark sites and airports.
Theresa May, the Home Secretary, insisted that the move was not a result of any specific plot, but in light of the increasing dangers posed by British fanatics and other foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria.
The change also comes less than a week before a Nato summit in south Wales, which will be the biggest gathering of heads of state in the UK.
The White House said that it had consulted with the British Government about the heightened threat level, but there was no plan to raise America’s equivalent threat notice.
In a Downing Street press conference, Mr Cameron said: “What we’re facing in Iraq now with Isil is a greater and deeper threat to our security than we have known before.
“In Afghanistan the Taliban were prepared to play host to al-Qaeda. With Isil we are facing a terrorist organisation not being hosted in the country but seeking to establish and then violently expand its own terrorist state.
“We could be facing a terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean bordering a Nato State.
“We are in the middle of a generational struggle against a poisonous and extremist ideology that I believe we will be fighting for years if not decades.”
Mr Cameron said that the world had been “shocked and sickened” by the Isil murder of James Foley, the US journalist, apparently by a British terrorist.
He said that he was “absolutely satisfied that Isil has specific threats and will make specific threats to the UK”.
Whitehall sources said Isil and other terrorist groups in Iraq and Syria are planning attacks against the UK and other Western countries.
The Prime Minister said: “It was clear evidence that this is not some foreign conflict thousands of miles from home that we can hope to ignore. The ambition to create an extremist caliphate in the heart of Iraq and Syria is a threat to our own security here in the UK.”
He said that the battle was between Islam and extremists who used a “poisonous ideology” and “the most brutal forms of terrorism to force people to accept a warped world view”.
Mr Cameron has been under pressure to join the US in air strikes against the terror group. Downing Street has insisted that no request has been made, but the Prime Minister yesterday would not rule out military action.
“We must use all the resources we have at our disposal,” he said. “Learning the lessons from the past doesn’t mean that there isn’t a place for our military.
“The military were vital in driving al-Qaeda from Afghanistan and we support the US air strikes against Isil in Iraq. Military force is just one element of what we can do.”
There have also been calls for changes in the law to help strip passports from British jihadists.
The Prime Minister promised there would be no knee-jerk reaction, but added: “It is becoming clear that there are some gaps in our armoury and we need to strengthen them. We need to do more to stop people travelling, to stop those who do go from returning and to deal decisively with those who are already here.”
He went on: “Adhering to British values is not an option or choice. It is a duty to those who live on this island. In the end it is only by standing up that we will defeat extremism.”
Earlier this week Scotland Yard warned that the arrest rate for those suspected of being involved in Syria or Iraq-related terrorism had increased five-fold since last year.
The decision to raise the threat level was taken by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, which operates out of MI5 and is independent of ministers.
Mrs May said: “We face a real and serious threat in the UK from international terrorism. I would urge the public to remain vigilant and to report any suspicious activity to the police.”


28/8/14

Countdown to Israel’s Destruction



Times of Israel. 28.8.14 

The round of fighting with Hamas is one more stage in Israel’s strategic downward spiral. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared victory. At the same time, Gaza’s Hamas rulers are dancing in the street. Ahmed Barakat, senior member of Hezbollah, has stated that the “countdown to the disappearance of the Zionist entity [Israel] in the region has begun.” Unfortunately, Netanyahu is wrong and Barakat is right.
If you count bodies and destroyed homes, Israel won the round. But if you look at the overall strategic situation, what you see is a steady deterioration in Israel’s position, both militarily and diplomatically. After the last Intifada, Israel’s enemies realized that suicide bombing alone cannot achieve their desired goal – the destruction of the Jewish state. So what they embarked on is a three-pronged strategy that involves low-level conflict and terror, combined with the development and production of weapons of mass destruction and an unrelenting media war designed to isolate Israel and create the international atmosphere necessary for its elimination. They have succeeded on all three fronts.
With respect to low-level conflict and terror, recently, in one week alone, Israel was fired on from Gaza by Hamas, from Lebanon by Hezbollah and from Syria by a combination of rebel and Syrian army forces. Kuneitra in Syria, right on the border with Israel, has fallen to Al-Qaida-affiliated forces. If not for the Egyptian army taking over Cairo, Israel would also be facing Al-Qaida in the Sinai and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. The noose is tightening.
Economically, a few relatively low-cost tunnels on the Gaza border and a few thousand cheap rockets and mortars have cost Israel billions of dollars and, for a couple of days, even shut down Ben-Gurion airport. Israel’s isolation was near total.
All this is possible because Israel is fighting with two hands tied behind its back. Its political and military leaders are so close to the trees, they can’t see the forest. They have not caught on to the idea that power is useless if you can’t wield it. Specifically, the forces lined up against Israel have spent billions of dollars in an unrelenting media war to delegitimize and isolate the Jewish state. They have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Today, Israel is a de-facto pariah state in the world.
Even during the worst days of South Africa’s Apartheid, no one called for the destruction of South Africa. What they were calling for is a regime change, not the annihilation of the state. With Israel, it’s different. In campuses around the world “progressive” students and faculty are openly calling for the elimination of the Jewish state. Israel’s defenders are reduced to a campaign of whining: “why do you criticize Israel and not genocidal regimes such as Sudan and Syria?” In other words, at this moment the best that Israel’s friends can do is put it in the company of mass murderers.
In the international media, Israel is portrayed as the enemy of peace, the disruptor of international stability and a racist, colonialist regime that targets Arab children for a pastime. The worst Nazi-type anti-Semitic stereotypes have been taken out of mothballs, dusted off and applied to the Jewish state by seemingly respectable people. Around the world, left-wing and right-wing demonstrators stand shoulder to shoulder calling for “death to Israel”.
In the suburbs of Paris, Jews have to fight street battles to prevent a synagogue from being burnt down with its congregation inside. In South Africa, a politician calls for the gunning down of South-African Jewish leadership in “retaliation” for the war in Gaza. In England, kosher products are taken off supermarket shelves, so as not to incite the local population.
And what is Israel doing about the media war that has made all this possible? Absolutely nothing. While billions of dollars are fuelling the anti-Israel campaign, Israel is spending zero. Israel’s leadership is fighting early Twentieth-century battles. They are spending billions on tanks and nothing on media. Its enemies are spending billions on media and almost nothing on tanks. Israel is fighting last century’s war. Its enemies are fighting the war of tomorrow, often with the low-tech, media-friendly tools of yesterday. This “Neo-Primitivism” involves decapitation on youtube and other such methods. Put differently, Israel may be at the cutting edge of High Technology, but its enemies are on the cutting edge of post-modern warfare.
Israel’s leadership still has the quaint idea that the media war is really a matter of “Hasbarah”. There are even “Hasbarah experts” in the employ of the government, and of the World Zionist Organization. “Hasbarah” is Hebrew for “explanation”. Israel’s leaders believe that the way to fight a media war is to fund a couple of civil servants whose task it is to “explain” to the world why Israel is right and its enemies are wrong. This is like fighting F-16s with slingshots. More seriously, it reveals the total bankruptcy of Israel’s strategic thinking. Basically, Israel’s leaders haven’t figured out that what is depicted on CNN and BBC is more important than what happens on the streets of Gaza. If you win the latter and lose the former, you are the big loser. You can have Hellfire missiles, but you won’t be able to use them. And if you do use them, America’s president will not replenish them – because he watches CNN, or at least his constituents do. Put simply, you cannot win a war on the ground if you don’t fight the war of the airwaves. The latter has nothing to do with “Hasbarah” and everything to do with strategic power.
But that’s not all. The fact is that the media war, even if Israel engages in it, will not be fought on a level playing field. Israeli ideology and culture creates a blind spot in its leaders’ worldview. They simply don’t have the tools to understand anti-Semitism. It’s out there, and it’s real and they can’t see it. No country surrounded by Hezbollah, Al-Qaida, Hamas and ISIS would have to engage in a media war to “explain” to the world that it lives in a tough neighborhood, except Israel. Cool progressives would not allow themselves to call for the destruction of any state on the face of the planet, except for Israel. The fact is that the present media war conducted against Israel by its enemies is aimed at a planet that is – by and large – receptive to the message. Less than 70 years after a million Jewish children were incinerated in the heart of Europe, the idea of Jewish fighters defending their children is still anathema to millions of people.
As for Israel’s “friends”, the news is not good. Most of the planet is against the Jewish state and, while ancient Jewish communities have become extinct from Yemen to Afghanistan, from Greece to Poland, anti-Israel Muslim populations have expanded exponentially. This combination of sociological factors guarantees that in the near future most states in the international community will work harder and harder to isolate the state of Israel like no state has been isolated before. Countries like Canada are an exception, but in reality Canada’s support turns on one man’s continued leadership, Stephen Harper. When he goes, so will Canada’s support. As for the United States, the so-called “Jewish lobby”, namely America’s Jewish population, is disintegrating before our eyes. America’s Jews are assimilating and intermarrying. Even if they identify as Jews, for most of them Israel is not a priority. In fact, many go out of their way to prove that they are Americans first by beating up on the Jewish state. One of the few reasons for America’s continued support – such as it is – is not the power of the Jewish constituency, but of the Evangelical Christian community. This, too, shall pass. The anti-Israel forces in the American Evangelical community – old-school Jimmy Carter types – are gaining strength. Many will desert Israel. Already, there are those who claim that the “real Jews” of the bible are the Palestinians and the Israelis are the “Romans who crucified our lord”.
If you think United States President Obama is lukewarm towards Israel, the day will come – and it’s not far – that Obama will look like a right-wing Zionist compared to the people who will sit in the White House. A new president shall come, who grew up on CNN and was educated on virulently anti-Israel campuses. He will not just hold back missiles, he will arm Israel’s enemies.
This is not science fiction. This is science. If the world sees you as a genocidal state, its leaders will seek your destruction. What’s “fiction” is the world that Israel’s leaders live in. Netanyahu’s world – where anti-Semitism is not a factor, where America has Israel’s back and where Hamas is really a loser despite the mass celebrations on Gaza’s streets – is a figment of his imagination.
Netanyahu and some of his Cabinet ministers – Naphtali Bennett is a good example – believe that going on CNN and sparring with Christiane Amanpour is what good media is all about. They don’t understand that these appearances – and the “high-fives” they get from their entourage – are useless. They can’t fight a war in Gaza by parachuting a couple of cabinet ministers into the fray. Neither can they fight a media war by showing off their command of English on CNN. Put simply, if it doesn’t start fighting this war, Israel will become more vulnerable than ever before. And this will happen in the next few months – just as Iran becomes a nuclear power.
So here’s my message to Israel’s leaders and supporters: it’s not too late. Start fighting the media war or we will go down in defeat – soon.


Read more: Countdown to Israel’s Destruction | Simcha Jacobovici | The Blogs | The Times of Israel http://blogs.timesofisrael.com/countdown-to-israels-destruction/#ixzz3BjRL68hs 

1/8/14

Israeli PM Netanyahu on CNN - FULL INTERVIEW 7/27/2014


Η προπαγάνδα να μην αλλοιώσει την αλήθεια

ΒΙΚΤΩΡΑ ΙΣΑΑΚ ΕΛΙΕΖΕΡ
ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ 31.07.2014

Η ​​αλήθεια είναι ότι ο αραβικός κόσμος δεν δέχθηκε ποτέ τη δημιουργία του εβραϊκού κράτους στην ιστορική γη του εβραϊκού λαού. Δεν ήταν το Ισραήλ που απέρριψε την απόφαση του ΟΗΕ το 1947, η οποία προέβλεπε την ίδρυση δύο κρατών ανάμεσα στον Ιορδάνη ποταμό και στη Μεσόγειο Θάλασσα. Τα στρατεύματα έξι αραβικών κρατών επιτέθηκαν εναντίον του υπό σύσταση κράτους του Ισραήλ προκειμένου να το εξαφανίσουν από τον χάρτη. Το 1967, η Συρία, η Ιορδανία και η Αίγυπτος απώλεσαν εδάφη μετά τον πόλεμο των Εξι Ημερών που οι ίδιες κήρυξαν εναντίον του Ισραήλ, με τη βεβαιότητα του παναραβικού ηγέτη Αμπντέλ Νάσερ ότι θα απωθούσε τους Εβραίους στη θάλασσα. Η Δυτική Οχθη του Ιορδάνη, η Χερσόνησος του Σινά και η Λωρίδα της Γάζας καταλήφθηκαν από το Ισραήλ.

Οταν όμως το 1978 υπογράφηκε η συμφωνία ειρήνης με την Αίγυπτο, το Ισραήλ αποχώρησε από τη Χερσόνησο του Σινά, απέσυρε οικισμούς και εποίκους και επέστρεψε στα προ του 1967 σύνορα. Η Αίγυπτος αρνήθηκε το «come back» της Λωρίδας της Γάζας, της οποίας την κυριαρχία είχε προ του πολέμου των Εξι Ημερών.

Μετά τις συμφωνίες του Οσλο, το Ισραήλ αναγνώρισε το δικαίωμα των Παλαιστινίων να αποκτήσουν ένα ανεξάρτητο κράτος στη Δυτική Οχθη και τη Λωρίδα της Γάζας. Οι δύο πλευρές όμως απέτυχαν να φθάσουν στην υπογραφή μιας βιώσιμης λύσης της σύγκρουσης. Το 2005, το Ισραήλ αποχωρεί μονομερώς από τη Λωρίδα της Γάζας, αποδεικνύοντας ότι δεν επιθυμεί τη συνέχιση της κατοχής εδαφών και ανθρώπων. Την εξουσία αναλαμβάνει η Παλαιστινιακή Αρχή, ενώ χιλιάδες Παλαιστίνιοι πανηγυρίζουν την απαλλαγή τους από την ισραηλινή κατοχή. Αντί όμως της ειρηνικής συνύπαρξης, οι παλαιστινιακές ισλαμιστικές δυνάμεις αποφασίζουν την κορύφωση του ένοπλου αγώνα κατά του Ισραήλ. Το 2006, η Χαμάς εκδιώκει τις δυνάμεις της Παλαιστινιακής Αρχής και καταλαμβάνει την εξουσία στη Γάζα.

Ο τρόμος είναι η οδυνηρότερη εκδήλωση μίσους εναντίον ενός λαού. Η ζωή ενός απλού πολίτη βρίσκεται σε συνεχή κίνδυνο την ώρα που περιμένει σε μια στάση λεωφορείου, όταν τα παιδιά του πάνε σχολείο, την ώρα που πίνει τον καφέ του σε μια καφετέρια. Περισσότεροι από 1.000 Ισραηλινοί πολίτες πέφτουν θύματα των επιθέσεων αυτοκτονίας και των ρουκετών της Χαμάς, οι οποίες εκτοξεύονται μόνο κατά αμάχων. Αντί να επενδύσουν στην παιδεία και στην υγεία του λαού τους, οι ηγέτες της Χαμάς προτίμησαν να επενδύσουν στη βιομηχανία παραγωγής εκτοξευτήρων και ρουκετών μέσα σε κτίρια διαμερισμάτων, σε σχολεία και σε νοσοκομεία προκειμένου να πολεμήσουν το Ισραήλ. Γιατί; Ποιος είναι ο στόχος τους; Να απαλλάξουν τους Παλαιστινίους από την παρουσία των Ισραηλινών στη Γάζα. Μα οι Ισραηλινοί δεν βρίσκονται πλέον στη Γάζα. Εάν η Χαμάς σταματούσε την τρομοκρατία εναντίον του Ισραήλ, όλα τα περάσματα θα παρέμεναν ανοικτά προκειμένου οι Παλαιστίνιοι να αναπτύξουν τη δική τους οικονομία, την εκπαίδευση, την υγεία. Είναι όμως φανερό ότι οι ηγέτες της Χαμάς περισσότερο θέλουν την καταστροφή του Ισραήλ παρά την ελευθερία και την ανάπτυξη των ιδίων των κατοίκων της Γάζας.

«Η αναλογικότητα των θυμάτων» είναι μία ακόμη συλλογιστική στη μηχανή προπαγάνδας της Χαμάς, στην οποία εγκλωβίζεται μάλιστα όχι μόνο ένα μεγάλο κομμάτι της κοινής γνώμης, αλλά και η παραδοσιακά υποκριτική Επιτροπή Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων του ΟΗΕ, η οποία διατάσσει έρευνα για την εκτέλεση εγκλημάτων κατά της ανθρωπότητας από το Ισραήλ, κλείνοντας ταυτόχρονα το μάτι στη Χαμάς, στο Ιράν, στη Σαουδική Αραβία, στη Λιβύη και τη Συρία για να συνεχίσουν ανενόχλητα να εγκληματούν κατά του Ισραήλ. Σήμερα 6 εκατ. Ισραηλινοί πολίτες απειλούνται μέρα και νύχτα από τις χιλιάδες ρουκέτες της Χαμάς. Τι απαιτούν οι δήθεν υπερασπιστές των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων από το Ισραήλ; Μήπως να καταργήσει τα καταφύγια και να καταστρέψει τα αντιπυραυλικά συστήματα ασφαλείας για να προκληθούν χιλιάδες θύματα αμάχων Ισραηλινών, για να αποδειχθεί ότι οι ρουκέτες της Χαμάς και οι πύραυλοι Γκραντ δεν είναι χαρτοπόλεμος; Το Ισραήλ έχει το νόμιμο δικαίωμα να αμυνθεί, ακριβώς όπως θα έπραττε κάθε άλλο κράτος που σέβεται τους πολίτες του. Εάν η Χαμάς σεβόταν τη ζωή των ιδίων των Παλαιστινίων κατοίκων της Γάζας δεν θα τους χρησιμοποιούσε ως ανθρώπινη ασπίδα για την προστασία του οπλισμού της ούτε θα έστελνε τα παιδιά της Παλαιστίνης να σκορπίσουν τον θάνατο σε άλλα παιδιά. Εκατοντάδες αθώοι Παλαιστίνιοι πέφτουν θύματα αυτής της απάνθρωπης εκμετάλλευσης από τη Χαμάς παρά τις προσπάθειες των Ισραηλινών να αποφευχθούν θύματα μεταξύ των αμάχων. Γιατί, στόχος των Ισραηλινών δεν είναι οι άμαχοι Παλαιστίνιοι αλλά οι τρομοκράτες της Χαμάς.

Κάθε πρωτοβουλία εκεχειρίας προϋποθέτει την αποδοχή της από τις δύο πλευρές. Είναι αδύνατον το Ισραήλ να αποδέχεται την εκεχειρία και η Χαμάς να την απορρίπτει και να συνεχίζει την εκτόξευση ρουκετών. Αυτό δεν είναι εκεχειρία αλλά μονομερής κατάπαυση του πυρός, πράγμα που το Ισραήλ δεν θα κάνει εάν δεν υλοποιήσει τον στόχο του, που είναι η προστασία της ζωής των αμάχων πολιτών της χώρας. Τα θύματα αυτού του ανηλεούς πολέμου είναι πολλά και πληγώνεται η ψυχή κάθε σώφρονος ανθρώπου για την απώλεια ζωής κάθε αθώου, Ισραηλινού ή Παλαιστινίου, και είναι πλέον βέβαιο ότι η οριστική λύση του προβλήματος δεν μπορεί να επέλθει μόνο με στρατιωτικά μέσα. Οφείλουν λοιπόν τόσο ο Μπέντζαμιν Νετανιάχου όσο και ο Μαχμούντ Αμπάς να επανέλθουν στο τραπέζι των διαπραγματεύσεων και να φθάσουν σε μια ιστορική συμφωνία, που θα υπηρετεί τη βούληση της μεγάλης πλειονότητας των λαών τους: Οι Ισραηλινοί να ζουν ασφαλείς στο δικό τους δημοκρατικό εβραϊκό κράτος, οι δε Παλαιστίνιοι να αποκτήσουν το δικό τους ανεξάρτητο αραβικό παλαιστινιακό κράτος.

29/7/14

7 Things to Consider Before Choosing Sides in the Middle East Conflict


Posted: 



Are you "pro-Israel" or "pro-Palestine"? It isn't even noon yet as I write this, and I've already been accused of being both.
These terms intrigue me because they directly speak to the doggedly tribal nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. You don't hear of too many other countries being universally spoken of this way. Why these two? Both Israelis and Palestinians are complex, with diverse histories and cultures, and two incredibly similar (if divisive) religions. To come down completely on the side of one or the other doesn't seem rational to me.
It is telling that most Muslims around the world support Palestinians, and most Jews support Israel. This, of course, is natural -- but it's also problematic. It means that this is not about who's right or wrong as much as which tribe or nation you are loyal to. It means that Palestinian supporters would be just as ardently pro-Israel if they were born in Israeli or Jewish families, and vice versa. It means that the principles that guide most people's view of this conflict are largely accidents of birth -- that however we intellectualize and analyze the components of the Middle East mess, it remains, at its core, a tribal conflict.
By definition, tribal conflicts thrive and survive when people take sides. Choosing sides in these kinds of conflicts fuels them further and deepens the polarization. And worst of all, you get blood on your hands.
So before picking a side in this latest Israeli-Palestine conflict, consider these 7 questions:
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1. Why is everything so much worse when there are Jews involved?
Over 700 people have died in Gaza as of this writing. Muslims have woken up around the world. But is it really because of the numbers?
Bashar al-Assad has killed over 180,000 Syrians, mostly Muslim, in two years -- more than the number killed in Palestine in two decades. Thousands of Muslims in Iraq and Syria have been killed by ISIS in the last two months. Tens of thousands have been killed by the Taliban. Half a million black Muslims were killed by Arab Muslims in Sudan. The list goes on.
But Gaza makes Muslims around the world, both Sunni and Shia, speak up in a way they never do otherwise. Up-to-date death counts and horrific pictures of the mangled corpses of Gazan children flood their social media timelines every day. If it was just about the numbers, wouldn't the other conflicts take precedence? What is it about then?
If I were Assad or ISIS right now, I'd be thanking God I'm not Jewish.
Amazingly, many of the graphic images of dead children attributed to Israeli bombardment that are circulating online are from Syria, based on a BBC report. Many of the pictures you're seeing are of children killed by Assad, who is supported by Iran, which also funds Hezbollah and Hamas. What could be more exploitative of dead children than attributing the pictures of innocents killed by your own supporters to your enemy simply because you weren't paying enough attention when your own were killing your own?
This doesn't, by any means, excuse the recklessness, negligence, and sometimesoutright cruelty of Israeli forces. But it clearly points to the likelihood that the Muslim world's opposition to Israel isn't just about the number of dead.
Here is a question for those who grew up in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries like I did: if Israel withdrew from the occupied territories tomorrow, all in one go -- and went back to the 1967 borders -- and gave the Palestinians East Jerusalem -- do you honestly think Hamas wouldn't find something else to pick a fight about? Do you honestly think that this has absolutely nothing to do with the fact that they are Jews? Do you recall what you watched and heard on public TV growing up in Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt?
Yes, there's an unfair and illegal occupation there, and yes, it's a human rights disaster. But it is also true that much of the other side is deeply driven by anti-Semitism. Anyone who has lived in the Arab/Muslim world for more than a few years knows that. It isn't always a clean, one-or-the-other blame split in these situations like your Chomskys and Greenwalds would have you believe. It's both.
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2. Why does everyone keep saying this is not a religious conflict?
There are three pervasive myths that are widely circulated about the "roots" of the Middle East conflict:
Myth 1: Judaism has nothing to do with Zionism.
Myth 2: Islam has nothing to do with Jihadism or anti-Semitism.
Myth 3: This conflict has nothing to do with religion.
To the "I oppose Zionism, not Judaism!" crowd, is it mere coincidence that this passage from the Old Testament (emphasis added) describes so accurately what's happening today?
"I will establish your borders from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, and from the desert to the Euphrates River. I will give into your hands the people who live in the land, and you will drive them out before you. Do not make a covenant with them or with their gods." - Exodus 23:31-32
Or this one?
"See, I have given you this land. Go in and take possession of the land the Lord swore he would give to your fathers -- to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob -- and to their descendants after them." - Deuteronomy 1:8
There's more: Genesis 15:18-21, and Numbers 34 for more detail on the borders. Zionism is not the "politicization" or "distortion" of Judaism. It is the revival of it.
And to the "This is not about Islam, it's about politics!" crowd, is this verse from the Quran (emphasis added) meaningless?
"O you who have believed, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are [in fact] allies of one another. And whoever is an ally to them among you--then indeed, he is [one] of them. Indeed, Allah guides not the wrongdoing people." - Quran, 5:51
What about the numerous verses and hadith quoted in Hamas' charter? And the famous hadith of the Gharqad tree explicitly commanding Muslims to kill Jews?
Please tell me -- in light of these passages written centuries and millennia before the creation of Israel or the occupation -- how can anyone conclude that religion isn't at the root of this, or at least a key driving factor? You may roll your eyes at these verses, but they are taken very seriously by many of the players in this conflict, on both sides. Shouldn't they be acknowledged and addressed? When is the last time you heard a good rational, secular argument supporting settlement expansion in the West Bank?
Denying religion's role seems to be a way to be able to criticize the politics while remaining apologetically "respectful" of people's beliefs for fear of "offending" them. But is this apologism and "respect" for inhuman ideas worth the deaths of human beings?
People have all kinds of beliefs -- from insisting the Earth is flat to denying the Holocaust. You may respect their right to hold these beliefs, but you're not obligated to respect the beliefs themselves. It's 2014, and religions don't need to be "respected" any more than any other political ideology or philosophical thought system. Human beings have rights. Ideas don't. The oft-cited politics/religion dichotomy in Abrahamic religions is false and misleading. All of the Abrahamic religions are inherently political.
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3. Why would Israel deliberately want to kill civilians?
This is the single most important issue that gets everyone riled up, and rightfully so.
Again, there is no justification for innocent Gazans dying. And there's no excuse for Israel's negligence in incidents like the killing of four children on a Gazan beach. But let's back up and think about this for a minute.
Why on Earth would Israel deliberately want to kill civilians?
When civilians die, Israel looks like a monster. It draws the ire of even its closest allies. Horrific images of injured and dead innocents flood the media. Ever-growing anti-Israel protests are held everywhere from Norway to New York. And the relatively low number of Israeli casualties (we'll get to that in a bit) repeatedly draws allegations of a "disproportionate" response. Most importantly, civilian deaths help Hamas immensely.
How can any of this possibly ever be in Israel's interest?
If Israel wanted to kill civilians, it is terrible at it. ISIS killed more civilians in two days (700 plus) than Israel has in two weeks. Imagine if ISIS or Hamas had Israel's weapons, army, air force, US support, and nuclear arsenal. Their enemies would've been annihilated long ago. If Israel truly wanted to destroy Gaza, it could do so within a day, right from the air. Why carry out a more painful, expensive ground incursion that risks the lives of its soldiers?
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4. Does Hamas really use its own civilians as human shields?
Ask Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas how he feels about Hamas' tactics.
"What are you trying to achieve by sending rockets?" he asks. "I don't like trading in Palestinian blood."
It isn't just speculation anymore that Hamas puts its civilians in the line of fire.
Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri plainly admitted on Gazan national TV that thehuman shield strategy has proven "very effective."
The UN relief organization UNRWA issued a furious condemnation of Hamas after discovering hidden rockets in not one, but two children's schools in Gaza last week.
Hamas fires thousands of rockets into Israel, rarely killing any civilians or causing any serious damage. It launches them from densely populated areas, including hospitals and schools.
Why launch rockets without causing any real damage to the other side, inviting great damage to your own people, then putting your own civilians in the line of fire when the response comes? Even when the IDF warns civilians to evacuate their homes before a strike, why does Hamas tell them to stay put?
Because Hamas knows its cause is helped when Gazans die. If there is one thing that helps Hamas most -- one thing that gives it any legitimacy -- it is dead civilians. Rockets in schools. Hamas exploits the deaths of its children to gain the world's sympathy. It uses them as a weapon.
You don't have to like what Israel is doing to abhor Hamas. Arguably, Israel and Fatah are morally equivalent. Both have a lot of right on their side. Hamas, on the other hand, doesn't have a shred of it.
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5. Why are people asking for Israel to end the "occupation" in Gaza?
Because they have short memories.
In 2005, Israel ended the occupation in Gaza. It pulled out every last Israeli soldier. It dismantled every last settlement. Many Israeli settlers who refused to leave wereforcefully evicted from their homes, kicking and screaming.
This was a unilateral move by Israel, part of a disengagement plan intended to reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians. It wasn't perfect -- Israel was still to control Gaza's borders, coastline, and airspace -- but considering the history of the region, it was a pretty significant first step.
After the evacuation, Israel opened up border crossings to facilitate commerce. The Palestinians were also given 3,000 greenhouses which had already been producing fruit and flowers for export for many years.
But Hamas chose not to invest in schools, trade, or infrastructure. Instead, it built anextensive network of tunnels to house thousands upon thousands of rockets and weapons, including newer, sophisticated ones from Iran and Syria. All the greenhouses were destroyed.
Hamas did not build any bomb shelters for its people. It did, however, build a few for its leaders to hide out in during airstrikes. Civilians are not given access to these shelters for precisely the same reason Hamas tells them to stay home when the bombs come.
Gaza was given a great opportunity in 2005 that Hamas squandered by transforming it into an anti-Israel weapons store instead of a thriving Palestinian state that, with time, may have served as a model for the future of the West Bank as well. If Fatah needed yet another reason to abhor Hamas, here it was.
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6. Why are there so many more casualties in Gaza than in Israel?
The reason fewer Israeli civilians die is not because there are fewer rockets raining down on them. It's because they are better protected by their government.
When Hamas' missiles head towards Israel, sirens go off, the Iron Dome goes into effect, and civilians are rushed into bomb shelters. When Israeli missiles head towards Gaza, Hamas tells civilians to stay in their homes and face them.
While Israel's government urges its civilians to get away from rockets targeted at them, Gaza's government urges its civilians to get in front of missiles not targeted at them.
The popular explanation for this is that Hamas is poor and lacks the resources to protect its people like Israel does. The real reason, however, seems to have more to do with disordered priorities than deficient resources (see #5). This is about will, not ability. All those rockets, missiles, and tunnels aren't cheap to build or acquire. But they are priorities. And it's not like Palestinians don't have a handful of oil-rich neighbors to help them the way Israel has the US.
The problem is, if civilian casualties in Gaza drop, Hamas loses the only weapon it has in its incredibly effective PR war. It is in Israel's national interest to protect its civilians and minimize the deaths of those in Gaza. It is in Hamas' interest to do exactly the opposite on both fronts.
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7. If Hamas is so bad, why isn't everyone pro-Israel in this conflict?
Because Israel's flaws, while smaller in number, are massive in impact.
Many Israelis seem to have the same tribal mentality that their Palestinian counterparts do. They celebrate the bombing of Gaza the same way many Arabs celebrated 9/11. A UN report recently found that Israeli forces tortured Palestinian children and used them as human shields. They beat up teenagers. They are oftenreckless with their airstrikes. They have academics who explain how rape may be the only truly effective weapon against their enemy. And many of them callously and publicly revel in the deaths of innocent Palestinian children.
To be fair, these kinds of things do happen on both sides. They are an inevitable consequence of multiple generations raised to hate the other over the course of 65 plus years. To hold Israel up to a higher standard would mean approaching the Palestinians with the racism of lowered expectations.
However, if Israel holds itself to a higher standard like it claims -- it needs to do much more to show it isn't the same as the worst of its neighbors.
Israel is leading itself towards increasing international isolation and national suicide because of two things: 1. The occupation; and 2. Settlement expansion.
Settlement expansion is simply incomprehensible. No one really understands the point of it. Virtually every US administration -- from Nixon to Bush to Obama -- hasunequivocally opposed it. There is no justification for it except a Biblical one (see #2), which makes it slightly more difficult to see Israel's motives as purely secular.
The occupation is more complicated. The late Christopher Hitchens was right when he said this about Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories:
"In order for Israel to become part of the alliance against whatever we want to call it, religious barbarism, theocratic, possibly thermonuclear theocratic or nuclear theocratic aggression, it can't, it'll have to dispense with the occupation. It's as simple as that.
It can be, you can think of it as a kind of European style, Western style country if you want, but it can't govern other people against their will. It can't continue to steal their land in the way that it does every day.And it's unbelievably irresponsible of Israelis, knowing the position of the United States and its allies are in around the world, to continue to behave in this unconscionable way. And I'm afraid I know too much about the history of the conflict to think of Israel as just a tiny, little island surrounded by a sea of ravening wolves and so on. I mean, I know quite a lot about how that state was founded, and the amount of violence and dispossession that involved. And I'm a prisoner of that knowledge. I can't un-know it."
As seen with Gaza in 2005, unilateral disengagement is probably easier to talk about than actually carry out. But if it Israel doesn't work harder towards a two-state (maybe three-state, thanks to Hamas) solution, it will eventually have to make that ugly choice between being a Jewish-majority state or a democracy.
It's still too early to call Israel an apartheid state, but when John Kerry said Israelcould end up as one in the future, he wasn't completely off the mark. It's simple math. There are only a limited number of ways a bi-national Jewish state with a non-Jewish majority population can retain its Jewish identity. And none of them are pretty.
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Let's face it, the land belongs to both of them now. Israel was carved out of Palestine for Jews with help from the British in the late 1940s just like my own birthplace of Pakistan was carved out of India for Muslims around the same time. The process was painful, and displaced millions in both instances. But it's been almost 70 years. There are now at least two or three generations of Israelis who were born and raised in this land, to whom it really is a home, and who are often held accountable and made to pay for for historical atrocities that are no fault of their own. They are programmed to oppose "the other" just as Palestinian children are. At its very core, this is a tribal religious conflict that will never be resolved unless people stop choosing sides.
So you really don't have to choose between being "pro-Israel" or "pro-Palestine." If you support secularism, democracy, and a two-state solution -- and you oppose Hamas, settlement expansion, and the occupation -- you can be both.
If they keep asking you to pick a side after all of that, tell them you're going with hummus.